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Abstract 26 
 27 
The years since the publication of Machiavellian Intelligence have witnessed a Golden 28 
Age in discoveries concerning social cognition in human and non-human primates and 29 
many other animal taxa too. Here I briefly dissect some of the variants of the social 30 
intelligence hypotheses that have evolved in this time and offer a selective overview of 31 
scientific discoveries in this field, particularly in primates, over the last 30 years. 32 
 33 
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In our introduction to Machiavellian Intelligence, Richard Byrne and I distinguished 38 
three different forms of ‘social intellect hypothesis’ embedded in the landmark article of 39 
Humphrey (1976) and other foundational contributions to the embryonic field of 40 
research that we reviewed (Whiten and Byrne 1988a). Such hypotheses have further 41 
proliferated since, but our originally-proposed triad remains worth re-visiting to 42 
structure this concise invited essay concerning developments in the field in the past 43 
three decades. Editorial requests for brevity preclude an exhaustive review. 44 
 45 
Hypothesis 1: Where social lives are as complex as those of many monkeys and 46 
apes, extensive components of cognition will have evolved as adaptations for 47 
dealing with this, yet in comparison to non-social cognition, social cognition  48 
includes rich phenomena awaiting discovery (note – this was a hypothesis of the 49 
1970s) 50 
 51 
Humphrey (1976) remarked that much of the testing of ‘intelligence’ in both human and 52 
non-human primates had, by then, been done through tests with physical objects, 53 
neglecting socially-oriented cognition. Thus if we think of intelligence/cognition as an 54 
iceberg, the suggestion was that the massive part beneath the surface represented 55 
uncharted social cognition. Perhaps calling this a ‘hypothesis’ over-dignifies it. 56 
However  I suggest that although the two further hypotheses I describe below are more 57 
obviously regular scientific hypotheses about cause and effect in the natural world, they 58 
have proved inherently challenging to test; by contrast, this first broad ‘hypothesis’ 59 
stimulated a generation of researchers to achieve monumental strides in delineating the 60 
complexities of animal social cognition. 61 
 The point can be illustrated by statistics extracted from a tabulation in Whiten 62 
(2018a) of Web of Science citations, including that ‘social/Machiavellian 63 
intellect/intelligence’ occurred in just 21 article titles (and in 60 as ‘topic’) in 1991-5, 64 
whereas for 2011-2015 the figure had risen to 123 (495 as ‘topic’). The corresponding 65 
figures for ‘social brain’ (see below) were 0 (title) and 3 (topic) in 1991-1995, but rose 66 
respectively to 146 and 537 for 2011-2015. And between these two periods ‘social 67 
cognition’ rose from 91 (title) and 302 (topic) to 932 and 6,281 citations respectively! A 68 
Golden Age indeed. 69 
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 The behavioral and cognitive domains addressed have become comprehensive, as 70 
foundational field observations have been supplemented by rigorous and revealing 71 
experiments. For example in primates alone (the order focused on by Humphrey and in 72 
Machiavellian Intelligence), investigations have spanned the following (noting for each, 73 
one or more recent reviews plus a more specific illustrative example of the 74 
sophistication revealed): (i) Social knowledge (Seyfarth and Cheney, 2015a, 2017); for 75 
example, a baboon threatened by another individual is likely later to treat both threats 76 
and reconciliatory grunts from associates of that individual differently, indicating 77 
knowledge of third-party relationships (Wittig et al. 2007a,b; Wittig et al., 2014, for 78 
similar findings in chimpanzees); (ii) Social computation and mindreading (aka theory 79 
of mind) (Call and Santos, 2012; Whiten 2013); Crockford et al. (2017) provided 80 
evidence of the recognition of the seeing-knowing link in wild chimpanzees, and 81 
Krupenye et al. (2017) showed that the gaze of chimpanzees and other apes indicated 82 
they may even compute the false beliefs of one individual with respect to the 83 
whereabouts of another; (iii) Tactical deception (Hall and Brosnan, 2017); rhesus 84 
monkeys stole whichever of two options a human was most likely not to hear or not to 85 
see (Santos et al., 2006); (iv) Social learning and culture (Galef and Whiten, 2017); 86 
naïve chimpanzees would discriminate by observation, and typically acquire, whichever 87 
of two alternative tool-use techniques they witnessed, generating traditions (Whiten et 88 
al. 2005); (v) Co-operation (Gilby, 2012); chimpanzees pulled a peg to release a 89 
conspecific helper when needed for a collaborative task, and moreover selected the best 90 
collaborators (Melis et al. 2006); (vi)  Vocal communication (Zuberbuhler 2012); 91 
chimpanzees were more likely to alarm bark to an experimentally-introduced snake 92 
when companions were ignorant of it (Crockford et al. 2012); and (vii) Gestural 93 
communication (Liebal et al. 2013; orangutans moderated their gestures intentionally 94 
according to the comprehension of target individuals (Cartmill and Byrne, 2007). It is 95 
the whole suite of such capacities for managing life in complex societies we thought it 96 
apt to tag specifically as ‘Machiavellian Intelligence’. For further recent overviews of 97 
what we have learned about such social cognition in primates and other animals, 98 
together complementing this present issue, see those edited by Seyfarth and Cheney 99 
(2015b), Meunier et al. (2017) and Di Paolo et al. (2018). 100 
 101 
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Hypothesis 2: Social complexity selects for greater general intelligence 102 
 103 
Humphrey’s paper was entitled ‘The social function of intellect’, aligning it with the 104 
discussion above and with the third hypothesis we shall meet below. However, it was 105 
framed as a solution to why many non-social tests had indicated heightened  106 
intelligence in primates. Accordingly, some researchers have sought to test whether 107 
social complexity begets greater general (‘domain-general’) cognitive performance, 108 
rather than cognition specifically serving social functions. This can be seen as a form of 109 
‘social intelligence hypothesis’ (Ashton et al. 2018) yet is not concerned with the 110 
aspects of Machiavellian Intelligence indicated above. 111 
 The approach can be illustrated by a recent intra-specific comparison between 112 
Australian magpies living in different sized groups, presented with four different kinds 113 
of learning tests, such as for spatial memory or reversal learning (Ashton et al. 2018). 114 
The average performance in larger groups was found to be superior on all four tests, the 115 
scores on which were inter-correlated, leading the authors to conclude that an effect of 116 
social complexity on a ‘general intelligence factor’ was implicated. Cognitive 117 
performance further predicted reproductive (fledging) success, providing evidence that 118 
cognition may indeed by favoured by natural selection in more complex (larger) 119 
societies, with potential longer-term evolutionary consequences. 120 
 Few such studies testing whether variation in sociability predicts differences in 121 
general cognition have been completed (see reviews in Bond et al. 2003; Ashton et al. 122 
2018). The necessary measures are difficult to engineer and implement, the more so in 123 
long lived animals such as most primates. An alternative approach was pioneered by 124 
Dunbar (1995), testing for relationships between the typical group size of a species as a 125 
proxy for their social complexity, and brain size (‘encephalization’) instead of 126 
cognition. In this approach brain size, or a variety of related measures such as relative 127 
size of the neocortex, may be regarded either as proxies for cognitive power, or as 128 
interesting variables in their own right (hence the underlying theory was dubbed a 129 
‘social brain hypothesis’ (Dunbar 1998). Unless such encephalization can be partitioned 130 
between social and other functions, it should provisionally be seen as an index of 131 
general intelligence, and indeed there is empirical evidence for such a relationship 132 
across primates (Deaner et al. 2006). 133 
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 A variety of studies have reported the predicted positive relationships between 134 
group size and encephalization, not only in primates (Dunbar and Shultz, 2007) but in 135 
other taxa such as ungulates and carnivores (Perez-Barberia et al. 2007). Some more 136 
recent studies report convergent results both for primates (Street et al. 2017) and 137 
cetaceans (Fox et al. 2017). However, other recent studies, exploring more extensive 138 
databases and different methodologies, have suggested that the support for Humphrey’s 139 
ideas offered by these approaches may be more dependent on particular methodologies 140 
or databases utilized than it had previously seemed (de Casien et al. 2017; Powell et al. 141 
2017). This line of work has accordingly become complex (some might say, tangled) 142 
and controversial of late. In any case, gross size of the brain or particular components of 143 
it are crude measures of both cognitive and neural functioning (Healy and Rowe, 2007), 144 
just as social group size is a crude measure of the kind of social complexity outlined in 145 
Machiavellian Intelligence, as illustrated by examples listed under ‘Hypothesis 1’ above 146 
(Whiten, 2018b).  147 
 It is to be hoped that future work will assess social complexity more directly (for 148 
diverse examples, see Burish et al., 2004; Bouchet et al., 2013). Whiten (2000) explored 149 
the dissection of primate social complexity into a number of measurable elements 150 
including polyadic complexity and the number of factors required for behavioural 151 
predictions, a framework adopted in recent United Nations Environment Programme 152 
attempts to take account of our discipline’s discoveries about animal culture and social 153 
complexity in conservation strategies (Culture Expert Group report, 2017) – a perhaps 154 
surprising but exciting and very welcome impact of our work.  155 
 156 
Hypothesis 3: Social complexity selects for more sophisticated levels of social 157 
cognition 158 
 159 
On the basis of all we have learned about animal social cognition in the past decades, 160 
this truly ‘Machiavellian intelligence’ hypothesis has come to be seen by a majority of 161 
researchers as at least highly plausible, and even as a working assumption (Seyfarth and 162 
Cheney, 2015a). But has this hypothesis really been tested? What is required to do so? 163 
If the Australian magpie study outlined above were extended to find that social 164 
complexity, as indexed by group size, predicted yet more heightened performance on 165 
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tests of social cognition, in turn predicting reproductive success, then this domain-166 
specific hypothesis would be addressed. Perhaps the closest studies in primates are 167 
those comparing closely related species. For example MacLean et al. (2013) compared 168 
six related species of lemur, showing that typical group size predicted a social cognition 169 
measure (taking account of attentional focus in simulated competition over food) but 170 
not a non-social cognition measure (a test of inhibitory control). These results and those 171 
of a similar comparison of four species of macaques (Joly et al. 2017) thus support the 172 
social intellect hypothesis (although not the social brain hypothesis, insofar as no 173 
relationship with absolute or relative brain size was found in the lemur study).  174 
 Does the scarcity of such studies imply a council of despair for Hypothesis 3? I 175 
suggest not, because if we recast the hypothesis as ‘Does much cognition in socially-176 
complex animals serve social functions?’, this has arguably been amply confirmed by 177 
the last three decades of research. Indeed, such behavioral and cognitive domains as 178 
were listed under Hypothesis 1, like social knowledge, social computation, 179 
mindreading, deception, social learning, cooperation and vocal and gestural 180 
communication, are arguably defined by the social functions they have been 181 
documented as serving. This conception of ‘function’, as in ‘the social function of 182 
intellect’, refers to relatively short-term consequences that are inferred to be the raison-183 
d’être of the entity of interest. So just as ‘the function of the heart is to pump blood’ we 184 
have ‘the function of social knowledge is to support social manoeuvering’ and ‘the 185 
function of social learning is to acquire cultural information’ and so on. The assumption 186 
then is that this is a consequence of past selection, although it remains a further 187 
empirical question whether variance in the performance of such functions can be shown 188 
to affect fitness (reproductive success), along the lines of the Australian magpie study. 189 
With these thoughts in mind, I briefly and selectively discuss two illustrations of 190 
specifically social cognition: mindreading and cultural learning.  191 
 192 
Mindreading. Contemporaneously with Machiavellian Intelligence, Whiten and Byrne 193 
(1998b) reported the results of surveys of primatologists’ reports of ‘tactical deception’. 194 
We tentatively proposed that many of these reports suggested that to succeed in the 195 
kinds of deception they evidenced, individuals were taking into account certain 196 
psychological states of their protagonists, such as their intentions or what they could or 197 
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could not see, a theme developed further in the second edition of our book (Whiten and 198 
Byrne, 1997). In later years, an ingenious series of experiments reported results 199 
consistent with the earlier observations, summarised in a comprehensive review by Call 200 
and Tomasello (2008) as suggesting, in chimpanzees at least, that they ‘understand 201 
others in terms of a perception-goal psychology” (p. 187); these authors added “as 202 
opposed to a full-fledged, human-like belief-desire psychology” but that is now 203 
challenged by the findings of Krupenye et al. (2017) on false belief recognition noted 204 
above. 205 
 Such findings in relation to primate recognition of what others can or cannot see, or 206 
hear, have become available so far only for relatively complex social species (Call and 207 
Santos 2012), so we lack variance in social complexity with which to directly tackle 208 
Hypothesis 3. Evidence for related abilities in quite different, avian species (Clayton et 209 
al., 2007; Bugnyar et al., 2016), whilst exciting, often relies on different methodologies 210 
that so far thwart direct comparisons, although the corvid species involved are also large 211 
brained amongst birds. Some studies do at least provide developmental perspectives on 212 
relevant cause and effect. Sallet et al. (2011) found that macaques reared in relatively 213 
larger groups displayed neural changes that included more extended grey matter 214 
connectedness in regions strongly associated with social functions, including the 215 
superior temporal sulcus and prefrontal cortex, regions associated with mindreading 216 
functions in humans. Noonan et al. (2014) further showed covariation of these regions 217 
in relation to both social network size and social status. They concluded that “this 218 
cortical circuit may be linked to the social cognitive processes that are taxed by life in 219 
more complex social networks and that must also be used if an animal is to achieve a 220 
high social status” (p. e1001940). 221 
 222 
A cultural intelligence hypothesis. Noting that the lack of social complexity in great 223 
ape genera such as orangutans does not appear to fit the relationships between social 224 
group size and encephalization reported in primates more generally, Whiten and van 225 
Schaik (2007; van Schaik et al. 2011) suggested that more recent findings of cultural 226 
complexity in the great apes (recently extended to all three genera: Whiten, 2017) may 227 
offer an alternative explanation of their special intelligence and encephalization. This 228 
‘cultural intelligence hypothesis’ has both ontogenetic and evolutionary elements. 229 
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Ontogenetically the proposition is that cultural inheritance of accumulated skills such as 230 
foraging techniques can make an individual smarter than otherwise; and in turn, this 231 
selects for advances in cultural cognition and brain structures that will support such 232 
processes, as well as, perhaps, technical intelligence such as understanding tool use, to 233 
capitalise on all that can be acquired culturally. This hypothesis can be regarded as an 234 
offshoot of earlier social intellect hypotheses, or as a competitor to them (Whiten and 235 
van de Waal, 2017;). It is early days in the testing of this hypothesis (Pasquaretta et al., 236 
2014). A recent example is the finding that in ‘level playing field’ tests in zoos, the 237 
slightly more encephalized Sumatran orangutans outperformed their Bornean cousins on 238 
a battery of cognitive tests, as predicted by the greater cultural richness of the 239 
Sumatrans in the wild (Forss et al. 2016). 240 
 241 
In Conclusion 242 
 243 
In many ways, all the discoveries that fit under the heading of Hypothesis 1 far outstrip 244 
the progress made in relation to Hypotheses 2 and 3 and their evolving derivatives like 245 
the Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis. These are inherently more challenging to put to the 246 
test than was anticipated in the excitement of the 1970s and 80s. The encouraging result 247 
is that we now know an enormous amount about the social cognition of primates and 248 
other socially complex taxa, providing substantial foundations to tackle the further 249 
questions the efforts of the last three decades have generated. 250 
 251 
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